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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
therefore has failed to perform his part by the exact time specified
therein.17
While there is much confusion in the theoretical discussion of
anticipatory breach, and the facts in the instant case may be capable
of another interpretation, the holding in the case is merely a reitera-
tion of the law as Bowen, L.J., first expressed it in Johnstone v.
Milling.18 "It would seem on principle that the declaration of such
inten ion by the promisor 'is not in itself and unless acted on by the
promisee a breach of contract; and that it only becomes a breach when
it is converted by force of what follows it into a.wrongful renuncia-
tion of the contract. Its real operation appears to be to give the
promisee the right of electing either to treat the declaration as brutum
fulmen, and holding fast to the contract to wait till the time for its
performance has arrived, or to act upon it, and treat it as a final
assertion by the promisor that he is no longer bound by the contract
and a wrongful renunciation of the contractual relation into which
he has entered. But such declaration only becomes a wrongful act
if the promisee elects to treat it as such. If he does so elect, it be-
comes a breach of contract and he can recover upon it as such." 1 9
This is the rule that is followed in all states that accept the doctrine,
and no authority, judicial or extra-judicial, has seriously questioned
its substance.
P. T. O'M.
DoMEsTIc RELATIONS-DIVORCE-INJUNCTION-FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT-COMITY.-The plaintiff, a resident of New York,
brings an action for separation against her husband. Her suit is
predicated upon the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and
abandonment. Due to the fact that the defendant husband had in-
stituted an action for divorce in France shortly before the commence-
ment of this action, the plaintiff seeks additional injunctive relief to
restrain the defendant from proceeding with his foreign action. The
defendant appeared generally. The trial court denied the plaintiff's
request for the injunction. The plaintiff appealed. Held, there is no
need for the injunction as the court here is not concerned with the
effect of the divorce decree of sister-state, but that of a foreign nation;
therefore the validity of the decree would be governed by principles
of comity rather than by the full faith and credit clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution. Gaskell v. Gaskell, 189 Misc. 504, 72 N. Y. S. 2d
440 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
The plaintiff's application was apparently based upon an exten-
sion of the doctrine of full faith and credit. In order to better under-
17 Po moy'S EQuirY JURISPRUDENCE § 1408 (5th ed. 1941).
28 Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q. B. D. 460 (1886).
21 Id. at 472, 473.
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RECENT DECISIONS
stand the plaintiff's position it is necessary to consider briefly the
history of the full faith and credit doctrine. The Constitution of the
United States imposes an obligation on the courts of one state to give
full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the courts of its
sister-states.1 However, this reciprocal recognition was qualified in
respect to decrees of divorce. This attitude was especially, set forth
in the much cited Haddock case.2 In that case the United States
Supreme Court held that the courts of New York did not violate the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution in refusing to recog-
nize a Connecticut decree of divorce in an action for separation by
the resident spouse. The Court, therein, set forth the principle that
mere domicile within the state of one party to the marriage does not
give courts of that state jurisdiction to render a decree of divorce
that will be enforceable in all other states against a non-resident who
did not appear in the action nor surrender to the court's jurisdiction.
On the authority of this decision the courts of this state have refused
to grant injunctions to the resident spouse in such an action to pre-
vent the non-resident spouse from further prosecuting the foreign
divorce suit."
The rule in the Haddock case 4 prevailed until it was expressly
overruled by the Supreme Court in the now famous Willins v. North
Carolina decision.5 The Court in that case concluded.that the full
faith and credit doctrine will be applied to a decree of a sister state
where such state has become the domicil of the migratory spouse.
In view of this later decision New York courts likewise reversed their
-previous stand by granting injunctions restraining New York citizens
from prosecuting divorce actions in foreign jurisdictions.6 However,
a non-migratory spouse can no longer rest assured that his or her
marital status will not be dissolved by a decree of a foreign court.
The query, raised by the plaintiff's contention, is whether or not
the court of New York should likewise extend full faith and credit
to divorces decreed by courts of foreign nations. This is, of course,
answered in the negative as it has been declared that the recognition
of such a judicial decree is a matter of comity.7 Comity, as distin-
U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
2 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 50 L. ed. 867 (1906).
3 Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. 2d 969 (1940).
4 Haddock v. Haddock, supra.
5317 U. S. 287, 87 L. ed. 279 (1942).
6 Pereira v. Pereira, 272 App. Div. 281, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 763 (1st Dep't
1947). But see Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 266, 89 L. ed. 1577(1945), in which the saijie parties of the earlier Williams case were involved,
wherein it was held that a decree rendered in one state may be impeached in
another by proof that the party who obtained the decree did not establish a
bona fide domicile.1 Martens v. Martens, 260 App. Div. 30, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 206 (1st Dep't
1940), rev'd on other grounds, 284 N. Y. 363, 31 N. E. 2d 489 (1940). For
construction of the general principles of comity, see Aetna Life Insurance Co.
v. Tremblay, 223 U. S. 185, 190, 56 L. ed. 398, 399 (1911); Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U. S. 113, 166, 167, 40 L. ed. 95, 109 (1895).
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guished from the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution,8
which imposes an obligation, is a matter of courtesy, complaisance,
and respect; not of right, but of deference and good will., The courts
of this state have recognized such foreign decrees on the theory of
comity; but in such instances the foreign courts either had personal
jurisdiction over the parties to the actions or the decrees were ren-
dered on grounds which were congruous with the laws and public
policy of New York.' 0 In order to promote the permanency of the
marital status the courts have construed this policy to be based upon
high moral standards, and have held that it is solely within their
discretion as to whether or not the divorce decree of a foreign nation
is in contravention of this public policy." Concededly, in the instant
case there might be some hardship and embarrassment imposed upon
the wife if the husband is guccessful in obtaining the foreign divorce.
However, hurt feelings and mere annoyances are not sufficient
grounds for injunctive relief.12
The apparent reason for restricting the doctrine of the
Williams Is case to judicial decrees of the several states can be best
understood when we consider that the majority of the Court, in the
Williams 14 case, was confronted with a national problem. The de-
cision was an attempt by the Court to obviate the precarious situation
of parties being married in one state and divorced in another 15 by
enforcing the very purpose of the Federal Constitution.16 It does
not seem as though the Court intended to abrogate its early decisions
to the effect that no right, privilege or immunity is conferred by the
Constitution in respect to judgments of foreign nations.17
True, the world today is getting smaller because of means of
rapid transportation and closer international relations. However, as
long as there continues such a wide diversity among the nations as
to the methods and grounds for granting divorce, it is submitted that
the American courts should not be obligated to minimize their pro-
tection of the marital status. It would seem that reciprocal full faith
and credit recognition on a universal basis should be postponed until
such time as there is a greater uniformity of divorce standards
throughout the world. A. M.C.
8 U. S. CoNsT. Art IV, § 1.
9 BLACi's LAW DIcrioNARY 356 (3d ed. 1933).
10 Gould v. Gould, 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923) ; see also C. F. Beach,
American Divorces in France, and Their Validity in the United States, 11 A. B.
A. J. 26 (1925).
11Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 508 (1920).
12 Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. 2d 969 (1940) ; Baumann
v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929).
13 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 87 L. ed. 279 (1942).
14Ibid.
25 See T. R. Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARv. L. REv. 930 (1945).
'6 Milvaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 276, 277, 80 L. ed. 220,
228 (1935).
17 See Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U. S. 185, 56 L. ed. 398
(1911).
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